On 15th August, speaking from the historic ramparts of the Red Fort, Prime Minister Narendra Modi made a significant announcement that drew national attention. He declared the launch of a ‘High-Power Demography Mission’, a move that he said was necessary to address one of the most pressing issues facing India—rapid demographic changes in sensitive regions.

The Prime Minister expressed grave concerns about demographic shifts, especially in border areas, stressing that such changes pose a direct threat to India’s national security. His words were firm and left no room for ambiguity. Modi warned the nation that “a well-thought-out conspiracy, the country’s demography is being changed, and the seeds of a new crisis are being sown. Infiltrators are snatching away the livelihood of the youth of my country. Infiltrators are targeting the sisters and daughters of my country. This will not be tolerated. These infiltrators mislead innocent tribals and capture their land. The country will not tolerate this.”

Addressing the nation on the 79th Independence Day, the Prime Minister highlighted that infiltrators were not only affecting the economy but also exploiting social vulnerabilities. He specifically mentioned how they target tribal lands, exploit women and children, and undermine the security of local communities. According to him, these activities were part of a larger scheme to alter India’s demographic fabric.

He further underlined the seriousness of the issue by saying, “When demographic change takes place in border areas, it causes a threat to national security…No country can hand it over to infiltrators…So, I would like to say that we have decided to start a ‘High-Power Demography Mission’.”

This announcement comes at a time when the government is already conducting Operation Pushback, a campaign aimed at detecting, detaining, and deporting illegal immigrants, particularly those from Bangladesh and Myanmar. The Centre has been taking stringent measures against both Bangladeshi and Rohingya infiltrators who have spread across border states like Assam, West Bengal, and Jammu & Kashmir. Reports in national media confirm that the government has intensified surveillance and deportation drives to address this growing crisis【source: Hindustan Times†L1-L7】.

The Prime Minister’s remarks also drew attention to the role of organized conversion campaigns. He referred to frequent cases of Muslims, such as Chhangur Peer Jamaluddin, being caught running conversion rackets funded by foreign organizations. Alongside, Christian Pentecostal pastors and missionaries have also been reported to hold conversion events disguised as ‘prayer meets’. Despite this, the Islamo-leftist groups, as described by critics, continue to deny the existence of any planned demographic strategy, brushing it off as an exaggeration.

However, the demographic changes are not just the result of cross-border infiltration. They are also being accelerated by differential population growth rates among various religious communities. In Assam, for example, the porous border with Bangladesh has historically allowed a large number of Bangladeshi Muslims to slip into Indian territory. Many of them manage to acquire fake identification documents like Aadhaar cards and ration cards, enabling them to settle, take up low-income jobs, encroach tribal lands, and in some cases, engage in criminal activity. Over time, this has significantly altered the population balance in several districts.

The seriousness of this issue was visible during the 2019 NRC (National Register of Citizens) exercise in Assam, where about 1.9 million people were excluded from the register. Census data further shows the trend: in 2011, Muslims formed 34% of Assam’s population, a sharp rise from 30.9% in 2001. Districts such as Dhubri, Barpeta, and Goalpara have already turned into Muslim-majority regions【source: Census of India†L1-L6】. This influx has triggered widespread opposition from indigenous Assamese communities, who see their culture, economy, and land rights being gradually eroded.

A similar trend can be seen in West Bengal, where districts like North 24 Parganas, Murshidabad, and Malda have witnessed a dramatic surge in the Muslim population. Critics allege that the Trinamool Congress government has turned a blind eye to illegal infiltration for political reasons, thereby worsening the problem. Other states like Tripura, Jharkhand, and Jammu & Kashmir have also reported significant numbers of illegal immigrants, deepening security and social challenges.

The announcement of the High-Power Demography Mission thus comes as both a warning and a strategic policy step. It signals that the government views demographic manipulation as more than just a social issue—it is a matter of national survival and security.

A Closer Look at India’s Religious Demography: Insights from District-Level Census Analysis

Economists and researchers—including Professor Shamika Ravi (member of the Economic Advisory Council to the Prime Minister), along with Mudit Kapoor, Sunil Rajpal, and S. V. Subramanian—contributed to a revealing study published in Economic & Political Weekly. This study examined changes in religious composition at the district level across India, using census data from 2001 and 2011.

The research, titled “Change in Religious Composition across Districts in India from 2001 to 2011”, presents a striking picture: while the Hindu population—historically the majority—shows signs of a gradual decline, the Muslim population—often referred to in political discourse as a “minority,” yet the second-largest religious group—has been on the rise. The findings are rooted in careful analysis of data from 640 districts across the country.

At the national level, the numbers point to these shifts:

• The Hindu share slipped slightly from 80.46% in 2001 to 79.8% in 2011.

• The Muslim share rose from 13.43% to 14.23%.

• Christian share also saw a modest uptick.

The district-level trends are even more illuminating:

• Hindus saw a decline in 468 out of 640 districts, which is more than 70%.

• In 227 districts, this fall was sharper than the national average drop of 0.7%.

• Muslims gained in 513 districts, while Christians increased their share in 439 districts.

The study further states:

_“Overall, the population growth in India from 2001 to 2011 was 17.7%. The dominant religion was Hindu in both censuses. The fastest population growth was among Muslims at 24.6%, and the lowest was among Jains at 5.4%. The share of the Hindu population declined from 80.46% in 2001 to 79.8% in 2011, a decline of approximately 0.7%. The percentage of the Muslim population increased from 13.43% in 2001 to 14.23% in 2011, an increase of 0.8%. Notably, the share of people who do not wish to state their religion has increased more than three times from 0.07% to 0.24% from 2001 to 2011,” the paper reads.

Regional dynamics further underscore these patterns:

• In West Bengal, illegal immigration aside, Muslim population surged particularly in Murshidabad, Malda, Uttar Dinajpur, North and South 24 Parganas—places where the Hindu share dropped by over 1%, a steeper decline than the national trend.

• In Assam, districts bordering Bangladesh—like Dhubri, Barpeta, Goalpara, and Morigaon—have recorded substantial increases in Muslim population. The study reinforces that along with illegal immigration, conversion has also contributed to this demographic shift, stoking fears among indigenous communities about losing their cultural and economic footing.

District-level growth rate comparisons add more depth:

• Among Muslims, the growth rate outpaced the national average in 458 (72%) districts.

• For Hindus, this was true in 268 (42%) districts.

• For Christians, their growth rate topped the national average in 417 (65%) districts.

The paper also highlights remarkable extremes:

_“At the other extreme, we found that there were 238 (37%) districts where the Christian population grew by more than 50%, while the corresponding number for Hindus and Muslims, where their population grew by more than 50%, was 23 (4%) and 55 (9%), respectively,” the analysis published in Economic & Political Weekly (EPW) reads.

Now, considering how population share changed:

• Muslim share rose in 513 (80%) districts.

• Hindu share increased in 172 (27%) districts.

• Christian share went up in 439 (69%) districts.

Looking at more substantial shifts:

• 150 (23%) districts saw Muslim share rise by more than +0.8%.

• 60 (9%) districts saw Hindu share rise more than +0.8%.

• 50 (8%) districts saw Christian share increase by more than +0.8%.

• On the flip side, 227 (35%) districts had Hindu share fall by more than –0.7%, while the corresponding numbers were 24 (4%) for Muslims and 32 (5%) for Christians.

These numbers point clearly to a steady decline in Hindu share and rising proportions of other religious groups—especially Muslims—across India’s districts.

Another layer of change appears in the Northeast states—Nagaland, Mizoram, Meghalaya, and Arunachal Pradesh—where Christians are witnessing rapid growth. Notably, in 238 districts, the Christian population jumped by more than 50% between 2001 and 2011. This surge coincides with active efforts by Christian missionaries offering education, healthcare, jobs, and even financial support to tribal communities, which may explain the rise.

Geographically, the Hindu population share has declined in parts of eastern India—like West Bengal and Assam; northwestern districts of Uttar Pradesh; coastal regions of Maharashtra and Karnataka; and the Malabar region in Kerala. Central areas of Maharashtra, Chhattisgarh, and Odisha also show notable decline. Meanwhile, Muslim share increased substantially in coastal Maharashtra, Karnataka, Malabar (Kerala), and eastern districts of West Bengal and Assam.

Maps that show how different religious groups are growing or shrinking across India tell a sharp story. They remind us that district-level shifts are more complex than what national or state-level numbers suggest. It’s important to remember that these changes don’t come just from numbers rising; they also depend on how fast one group grows compared to others and how big each group was to begin with in each area.

This kind of fine-grained insight often gets lost when we only look at the big picture of national or state figures.

Earlier this year, a report from the Centre for Policy Studies (CPS) brought another layer of concern. Titled Religious Demography of India: Rising Religious Imbalance in the Declining Fertility Regime of Kerala, the research revealed something striking about birth patterns in Kerala.

It found that despite Hindus accounting for 54% of the state’s population in 2011, by 2019, Muslims made up 44% of live births, while Hindus accounted for 41%—indicating a growing shift that began after 2015.

Moreover, between 2008 and 2021, the share of Muslims in total live births rose sharply, sometimes overtaking Hindus. Meanwhile, the Hindu share fell significantly, and a similar trend was seen among Christians.

The CPS study puts numbers on these trends: between 2008 and 2019, the share of Muslims in newborns rose from 36.3% to 44.4%, while Hindus dropped from 45.0% to 41.0%, and Christians from 17.6% to 14.3%. In simpler terms, Muslim share rose by 8 percentage points, while Hindu and Christian shares dropped by 4 and 3.3 percentage points, respectively.

The report also cites Kerala's overall trends: total live births peaked at 5.60 lakh in 2011, fell to 5.16 lakh in 2015, and dropped further to 4.20 lakh in 2021—a steep decline that underlines the state’s falling fertility rate.

Shifting to a broader historical view, a study by the Economic Advisory Council to the Prime Minister (EAC-PM) laid out trends from 1950 to 2015. It found that the Hindu share of India’s population dropped by 7.82 percentage points, falling from 84.68% to 78.06%, while the Muslim share rose from 9.84% to 14.09%, a 43.15% increase. Christians saw a 5.38% increase, and Sikhs a 6.58% rise.

Together, these studies draw a clear picture: in what’s traditionally a Hindu-majority country, the Muslim population growth—especially in key areas and through newborn data—stands out. A combination of lower fertility among Hindus and Christians, ongoing conversion debates, and claims of “population jihad” adds more emotional weight to the issue.

“Demography is Destiny,” But Why? History Has the Answer

It might sound like a cliché, yet the saying “demography is destiny” holds powerful truth. Across history, when Hindus became a minority in a region, secular values often weakened. India’s long-standing Hindu majority has played a big role in keeping the country’s secular spirit alive.

So, what happens when that majority is threatened—not just by illegal migration in border regions, but also by rapid demographic change within the population? When birth patterns change significantly or groups grow faster than others, it can create social and cultural imbalances. Some of these shifts, like those reported by OpIndia, link Rohingya and Bangladeshi immigrants to crime, smuggling, and attempts at conversion. According to them, such actions also displace local livelihoods in favor of newcomers.

A real-life example comes from Assam, where illegal settlers have ventured into tribal lands, leading to conflict and cultural displacement. Adding to the tension are disturbing headlines—such as incidents where in June 2025, the severed head of a cow was found at a Hanuman temple in Dhubri, a predominantly Muslim area, the day after Bakri Eid. These acts, seen by many as targeted, have heightened public fears.

In Tripura, demographic changes have transformed Hindu tribal and non-tribal communities into minorities, creating an unsettling sense of insecurity. Reports from outlets like OpIndia chronicle troubling incidents: temple vandalism, cow slaughter near Hindu areas, and mob violence—all actions seen as asserting religious dominance and threatening India’s cultural fabric.

The change in India’s religious composition has created what are now referred to as “Muslim areas” or “Muslim-dominated areas.” In practice, these have increasingly become undeclared no-go zones for Hindus and non-Muslim communities. Over the years, incidents have multiplied where Hindu processions or celebrations passing through such areas faced violence. Often, mobs are gathered by giving calls from mosques to pelt stones and attack Hindus celebrating their festivals or even a cricket match victory.

Outlets like OpIndia have repeatedly documented such violent episodes—stone-pelting during Ram Navami, attacks on Hanuman Jayanti processions, obstructions during the Kawad Yatra, and even violence linked to India’s World Cup cricket victories. In some cases, clashes have erupted over films like Chhaava, which depicted Islamic invaders as “jihadist barbarians”—a portrayal met with mob hostility.

Though changes in a district’s demography often happen gradually, their adverse impacts are radical. Across many places, Muslims have objected to Hindus openly celebrating festivals such as Holi, Diwali, Durga Puja, Durga Visarjan, or Ganeshotsav. These objections have led to clashes and harassment in both Muslim-majority and mixed-population areas.

The evidence shows this is not a matter of exaggeration. “Wherever the Muslim population has surpassed Hindus, the Hindu community is either forced to move away or live in fear.” Uttar Pradesh’s Sambhal offers a telling example. There, Muslims form a majority. When a mosque survey sparked riots last year, Hindu temples that had already stood closed and abandoned for decades revealed why: they were illegally occupied by Muslims.

What strengthens such Islamist assertion, critics argue, is political patronage. Unlike Hindus and other communities, Muslims are often treated as a consolidated vote bank. With demographic changes comes electoral change: constituencies where Muslims dominate begin to elect representatives sympathetic to their interests. Over time, “Change in demography brings change in the electorate, too.”

This is not a new phenomenon. Even in the pre-independence era, regions with high Muslim concentration—like Bengal and Punjab—saw rising communal tensions. These tensions grew into political demands. History records how the Muslim League capitalized on these demographics, pressing for separate electorates. The British, true to their “divide and rule” strategy, obliged. Through the Morley-Minto Reforms of 1909 and later the Government of India Act of 1935, Muslims were granted exclusive electorates, allowed to vote only for Muslim candidates. Hindus, however, had no such privilege.

The ideological root of separatism had been laid even earlier, in 1876, when Syed Ahmed Khan put forward the divisive “Two-Nation Theory.” Separate electorates emboldened Muslims further, fueling ambitions of a land exclusively for them.

At its core, Islamic theology views idol-worshippers with disdain. “Islam does not hold non-Muslims, especially idol-worshipping Hindus, in high regard; in fact, it labels them the worst of the sinners (mushriks).” Against this backdrop, intolerance of Hindus, Sikhs, and other non-Muslims is less surprising. Combined with political appeasement, this intolerance grew into secessionist demands, ultimately culminating in the partition.

It is often claimed today that Muslims “chose” secular India over Pakistan in 1947. But the provincial elections of 1946 tell a different story. Stirred by religious appeals, Muslims voted overwhelmingly for the Muslim League. “In total, 87% seats were won by the Muslim League in India in 1946.” The demand for Pakistan found legitimacy, and soon after came Direct Action Day—a call from Jinnah that unleashed horrific riots. The result was bloodshed, rape, and destruction, and finally, the birth of Pakistan “on the corpses of countless humans.”

This dark chapter of history still carries relevance today. Just as then, areas with Muslim dominance often take on the character of “Mini Pakistan.” Even in recent years, protests against laws like the Waqf Bill have spiraled into anti-Hindu violence, where mobs resorted to temple desecration, cow slaughter, and attacks on Hindus to force political concessions.

The irony is stark: despite numerous documented cases of Hindus being attacked for celebrating cricket victories or religious festivals, Muslims are still projected as ‘victims’.

Prime Minister Modi’s warnings about demographic change gain weight when considered alongside global and domestic surveys. In 2021, research by Pew Research Center revealed that “74% of Indian Muslims prefer Sharia laws over Indian laws.” With exclusivist attitudes already visible, any demographic tilt risks worsening tensions. For instance, after the fall of Sheikh Hasina in Bangladesh, Hindus there faced widespread Islamist violence. Similar patterns were seen in Murshidabad, West Bengal, where Hindus were attacked during anti-Waqf Bill protests. In such clashes, “Hindus are the first casualty of Muslim dominance.”

This pattern echoes the years leading to partition, when Muslims—while carrying out atrocities—claimed victimhood to push for separation. Partition carved India on Islamic lines because secular leaders gave in to unyielding demands of Islamic leadership. Now, as India marks its 79th Independence Day, stark comparisons remain. Pakistan, created as an Islamic state, later split again in 1971, with Bangladesh emerging—while India, despite challenges, has risen as a global power.

Yet, the hard truth remains: “This economic growth, military might, and global influence will be futile if India’s demography is altered.” To prevent history from repeating itself, experts and political leaders stress urgent action. The government’s step to form a High-Power Demography Mission is seen as vital. But more must follow: quick expulsion of illegal immigrants, strict anti-conversion laws, and resolute protection of indigenous communities.

After all, India’s secular character itself rests on its Hindu majority. “It is only because Bharat is a Hindu majority (yet) that even after a bloodied partition on Islamic lines, constant attacks on the Hindu faith, political suppression and neglect of Hindus for a very long time, the country remains secular. Bharat sans Hindus is just Pakistan-in-the-making.”