In the Supreme Court, ‘oral mentioning’ worked for decades as an informal pressure-release system. At the start of the court day, advocates would stand up and request that their cases be listed out of turn, usually by pointing to urgency. This system was genuinely helpful in serious and time-sensitive matters involving the death penalty, imminent demolition, bail, habeas corpus, and eviction. In such situations, speed mattered and oral mentioning often prevented irreversible harm.

Over time, however, this practice also created an alternative and unofficial entry point into the Court’s daily schedule. Instead of following a predictable and uniform process, access increasingly depended on an advocate’s prominence, seniority, and physical presence in Court No. 1. The result was a growing perception that some cases moved faster not because they were more urgent, but because they were backed by better-known voices. With a set of reforms introduced on December 1, 2025, Chief Justice Surya Kant has attempted to directly address this imbalance and restore fairness at the very first stage of court access.

The New Framework

The centrepiece of the reform is a Registry circular dated November 29, 2025. This circular makes it clear that, except in a few narrowly defined situations, oral mentioning before the Chief Justice of India will no longer be permitted. It also introduces a strong safeguard: while junior lawyers may still be encouraged to undertake whatever limited oral mentioning remains under the new system, no designated Senior Advocate is allowed to do so before any court. This change is significant because oral mentioning had gradually come to be seen as a privilege reserved for the most recognisable speakers in Court No. 1, reinforcing the impression that influence could shorten the queue.

In place of this personality-driven ritual, the Court has introduced a documented and predictable procedure. Under the new system, cases that fall within specific urgency categories are automatically listed within the next two working days, once filing is verified and defects are removed. These categories include matters relating to personal liberty and urgent interim relief. Both the urgency categories and the internal timelines are clearly set out in the circular. Litigants are informed that there is no need to mention their cases orally for inclusion in these categories. Once verified and cleared by the cut-off time, such matters are placed directly into the Main List or the Supplementary List. This reform is especially citizen-focused, as it aims to ensure that a person’s liberty does not depend on whether a senior advocate can speak at exactly 10:30 a.m. .

The circular clearly lists the matters that qualify for automatic listing. These include regular bail, anticipatory bail, cancellation of bail, death sentence cases, habeas corpus petitions, eviction or dispossession matters, demolition cases, and any other matter requiring urgent interim relief. At the same time, the circular introduces a compliance requirement. After registration, bail matters must be forwarded to the respondent’s Nodal Officer or Standing Counsel of the Union, State, or Union Territory. If this step is not completed, the case may not be confirmed or listed. In effect, the Court is signalling that urgency must be paired with basic procedural fairness, and that half-prepared cases should not be rushed into hearing merely by invoking urgency.

A second layer of regulation applies to cases that do not fall under automatic listing or where a party seeks an earlier date than the one already assigned. In such situations, mentioning is permitted only through a structured process. Advocates must submit a Mentioning Proforma along with a Letter of Urgency to a designated Mentioning Officer within fixed deadlines. These are usually by 3:00 p.m. on the previous working day and by 11:30 a.m. on Saturdays. For a limited category of ‘exceptionally urgent’ cases, which include anticipatory bail, death penalty matters, habeas corpus, eviction or dispossession, and demolition, the proforma and urgency letter must be submitted by 10:30 a.m. Crucially, every such request now goes through the Registrar (Judicial Listing), and must explain clearly why the matter cannot wait for listing on the scheduled date.

The third layer of reform directly addresses the open-ended nature of traditional oral mentioning. Only matters that appear on a publicly notified Mentioning List may be mentioned. Everything else is prohibited. Even then, only a filed application seeking urgent relief or an early hearing can be considered, and only through the proforma-based process. Regular hearing matters cannot be mentioned for listing at all. This change is not merely cosmetic. It converts what was once a spontaneous and personality-driven courtroom moment into an administrative decision based on standardised information and clear time stamps. This makes the process traceable, reviewable, and more transparent.

Taken together, these measures show a clear strategic shift under Chief Justice Surya Kant. The focus has moved away from who can persuade the bench in a brief oral request and towards identifying which cases objectively require immediate judicial time. This direction was signalled even on his first day in office. According to reports, the Chief Justice clarified that, except in exceptional circumstances, urgent listing requests must be made in writing through mentioning slips, with the Registry assessing urgency in the first instance. This approach is not anti-lawyer. Instead, it reflects a belief that procedural equality is essential for the legitimacy of a court that must manage tens of thousands of pending cases with limited hearing time.

From Oral Requests to Written Rules

These changes are part of a longer institutional journey. Concerns about oral mentioning were raised repeatedly by previous Chief Justices. The practice of queue-jumping through mentioning was increasingly seen as distorting access to justice. In 2024, Chief Justice Sanjiv Khanna prohibited oral mentioning and required advocates to submit urgency requests through emails, printed slips, or written letters. Earlier, in 2018, Chief Justice Ranjan Gogoi barred urgent mentioning until clear parameters were laid down, allowing exceptions only in extreme situations such as eviction or execution. Even in 2025, Chief Justice B.R. Gavai sought to restrict the appearance of senior counsel in Court No. 1 to create space for junior lawyers and reduce the dominance of established voices. What distinguishes the Surya Kant phase is not merely intent, but the simultaneous introduction of automatic listing, structured mentioning through proformas, published mentioning lists, and strict verification discipline, all working together as a single system.

How Oral Mentioning Was Misused

The sensitive but unavoidable question is how and by whom oral mentioning was misused. From a professional standpoint, the most balanced answer is that even when individual requests were genuine, the system itself was vulnerable to misuse. Because oral mentioning took place in open court, within a narrow time window, and without the ability to verify claims immediately, it tended to favour those with physical presence and familiarity in Court No. 1, strong courtroom confidence and capital, and the skill to frame urgency persuasively in seconds. These advantages often correlated with senior members of the bar and well-funded litigants. Commentary around the 2024 ban noted that wealthy clients could secure out-of-turn hearings by engaging senior counsel, while the Court spent substantial judicial time each morning listening to competing claims of urgency.

Where Ideology Fits In

Many high-profile public interest litigations in India, often dealing with free speech, civil liberties, executive action, or governance, are argued by a small group of prominent senior advocates. These lawyers span a wide ideological range, from conservative to moderate to left-liberal. The more important point is that activist litigation is naturally designed to be urgent, high-impact, and media-sensitive. In such a setting, a discretionary and personality-based gatekeeping system predictably rewards the loudest and most networked litigators. This reinforced a public perception of two parallel tracks: one for ordinary litigants who waited their turn, and another for high-salience cases that reached the Court faster through effective mentioning. Seen in this light, the Surya Kant reforms reduce discretion at the entry point and allow verified urgency, especially involving personal liberty, to determine priority.

Constitutional and Administrative Context

The legitimacy of these reforms is strengthened by constitutional and administrative principles. The Chief Justice’s authority as the ‘Master of the Roster’ has been repeatedly upheld by the Supreme Court. Listing and roster management are administrative functions essential to institutional operation. In Campaign for Judicial Accountability and Reforms v. Union of India (2018) 1 SCC 196, the Court reaffirmed that roster control cannot be undermined by competing claims. While oral mentioning is not identical to roster allocation, it directly affects listing outcomes. Regulating it through documented rules is therefore a form of necessary administrative housekeeping that strengthens institutional impartiality.

From a governance perspective, these changes align with court administration in the digital era. For years, the Supreme Court’s e-Committee has promoted structured systems for urgent listings, including online platforms for submitting urgent briefs. The 2025 reforms apply this logic to daily courtroom practice. They aim to ensure that urgency is assessed with minimal drama, maximum documentation, and equal opportunity. Rather than a crackdown, Chief Justice Surya Kant’s approach can be understood as a rebalancing. It narrows a VIP-prone entry point that had begun to harm the Court’s reputation, while preserving responsiveness in matters of personal liberty and urgent interim relief. The circulars reorganise urgency instead of eliminating it, with the broader goal of distributing the Court’s time according to principle rather than proximity or prominence .