Peter Navarro, the former trade adviser to U.S. President Donald Trump, lashed out at Elon Musk on X after his post about India’s Russian oil imports was corrected by a community fact-check on Saturday, 6th September.

Navarro alleged Musk was allowing “propaganda,” but the platform’s readers swiftly corrected him. “Wow. @elonmusk is letting propaganda into people’s posts. That crap note below is just that. Crap. India buys Russian oil solely to profiteer. It didn’t buy any before Russia invaded Ukraine. Indian government’s spin machine is moving at high tilt. Stop killing Ukrainians. Stop taking American jobs.”

Why this claim fails on facts: India did buy Russian crude before the 2022 invasion (albeit in small volumes): in April 2022, Reuters noted India bought more in two months than in all of 2021, which directly shows pre-war purchases existed — the “didn’t buy any” line is false. Second, India’s government and courts face no UN sanctions banning such trade; the legality point is clear and repeatedly affirmed by Indian officials as an energy-security necessity for 1.4 billion people. Third, the “solely to profiteer” jab ignores that India froze retail prices for long stretches and state-run oil firms absorbed heavy losses to shield consumers. These facts are incompatible with the idea of pure profiteering.

Navarro doubled down with another post: “FACTS: India highest tariffs costs U.S. jobs. India buys Russian oil purely to profit/Revenues feed Russia war machine. Ukrainians/Russians die. U.S. taxpayers shell out more. India can’t handle truth/spins @washpo Leftist American fake news.” But the “U.S. jobs” line is an assertion, not evidence; U.S.–India trade dynamics are complex and multicausal, while energy flows since 2022 have been shaped by sanctions, freight dislocations, and OPEC+ supply cuts — not by India alone. Reuters documents OPEC+ members cutting 5.86 million barrels per day, a global factor that tightened supply regardless of India’s purchases.

He was referring to coverage in The Washington Post about Washington’s harsh rhetoric and its impact on ties with India — a real debate, but one that doesn’t validate his factual errors about India’s pre-war purchases or motives.

X’s community note publicly fact-checks Navarro

X users flagged Navarro’s post, specifically dismantling the “profiteer” tag. The note said: “Navarro’s claims are hypocritical. India’s legal, sovereign purchases of Russian oil for energy security do not violate international law. The US, while pressuring India, continues to import billions in Russian goods, like uranium, exposing a clear double standard.”

Why the “double standard” point lands: The U.S. did continue importing Russian nuclear fuel for its reactors after banning Russian oil in 2022. In May–June 2024, a bipartisan bill to ban Russian uranium was signed — but with waivers allowing imports through 2027–2028 to avoid supply shocks. In other words, Washington itself recognized an energy-security exception while criticizing others for similar reasoning. That’s the core of the community note’s “hypocrisy” claim.

An earlier version of the note reportedly emphasized intent, stating the purchase was “for energy security, not just profit” — which mirrors India’s consistent official stance that buying discounted crude was about supply stability and inflation control, not quick gains.

Navarro’s ongoing attacks against India

This isn’t Navarro’s first swipe at India’s energy policy. He has repeatedly framed New Delhi as “feeding Russia’s war machine,” and last week he told Bloomberg TV: “India is helping feed the Russian war machine. I mean Modi’s war, because the road to peace runs, in part, through New Delhi.” India formally rejected these claims. MEA spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal said the remarks were “inaccurate and misleading.” Multiple outlets recorded the on-record rejection during the weekly briefing.

Context matters here: U.S.–India ties are under visible strain over tariffs and Russia policy, and major outlets describe competing approaches within Washington on how to handle India. That political tug-of-war explains Navarro’s rhetoric — but it doesn’t excuse factual overreach about India’s pre-war oil purchases or its legal latitude to buy energy where it finds it.

Navarro earlier alleged India’s Russia oil trade is purely profiteering

Navarro previously argued India’s imports weren’t driven by domestic demand but by illicit profit. The record suggests otherwise. After the war began, crude prices spiked globally; India’s oil PSUs kept domestic pump prices largely steady and absorbed billions in losses to protect consumers — hardly the hallmark of profiteering. Credible estimates peg losses for OMCs in the $2.25–$2.5 billion range during price freezes around late-2021 to early-2022, with under-recoveries persisting into 2022–23.

Meanwhile, New Delhi forced private refiners to prioritize the home market, requiring at least 50% of petrol and 30% of diesel export volumes be supplied domestically — and imposed export duties/windfall levies to deter arbitrage. These measures cut against the idea of “pure profit” and support the case that policy aimed at domestic supply security.

Finally, the broader price environment matters: OPEC+ cuts totaling 5.86 mb/d reduced global supply; Russia re-routed crude to Asia (not just India), and the G7 price-cap framework was designed to keep barrels flowing while limiting Moscow’s take. The IEA has written that rerouting to third countries helped minimize global production losses — again showing why singling out India as “the” problem is analytically weak.

Bottom line: Navarro’s claims stumble on facts (India did buy pre-war), law (no UN ban), policy (domestic obligations and taxes), and context (global supply cuts and Western waivers on sensitive Russian commodities).