India is now actively seeking to renegotiate the historic Ganga water-sharing treaty with Bangladesh. This decision comes at a time when the country is under immense pressure due to rising domestic water demand and shifting geopolitical developments. The move follows closely on the heels of a tragic terrorist attack in Pahalgam in April 2025, after which India suspended the Indus Waters Treaty with Pakistan. It didn’t take long for India to signal a similar reconsideration of the Ganga accord with Bangladesh.

The Ganga treaty, which has played a key role in regulating dry season flows of the river to downstream Bangladesh, is due to expire in 2026. Any continuation of this treaty beyond that will require mutual consent between India and Bangladesh. Indian officials have made it clear to Dhaka that any future agreement must account for India’s growing development needs, which include urban water supply, agriculture, and industrial consumption.

Currently, the Ganga treaty is set for a 30-year duration, but India is now advocating for a much shorter 10 to 15-year term in any future renewal. This change in stance has caused growing unease in Dhaka. Bangladesh is especially nervous because India has already suspended a major water treaty with Pakistan, raising fears of further regional water insecurity. The focus has now turned sharply to how both India and Bangladesh will balance their water needs under the framework of a treaty that was crafted almost three decades ago.

Historical backdrop to the Ganga treaty

The Ganga River is a critical source of life for both India and Bangladesh. The issue of sharing its waters has always been sensitive and, at times, contentious. Disputes over water sharing began way back in the 1950s, when India initiated construction of the Farakka Barrage in West Bengal. The primary purpose of the barrage was to divert water to aid Kolkata, especially to reduce silt and keep its port navigable. However, this created significant concern downstream in then East Pakistan, which depended heavily on the Ganga’s flow.

The Farakka Barrage became a key point of contention as water from the river began to be diverted before entering Bangladesh. After Bangladesh gained independence in 1971, both nations started working towards interim arrangements. In 1972, the two countries established the Joint Rivers Commission (JRC) to manage river-related issues. A short-term agreement followed in 1977, providing a five-year water-sharing pact that lasted from 1978 to 1982 and ensured Bangladesh received a minimum guaranteed flow.

After this pact ended, there was a prolonged period of uncertainty. Between 1982 and 1995, the countries only managed to operate through ad-hoc arrangements, with no long-term solution. During this time, India frequently diverted water unilaterally during dry seasons, which put considerable stress on the relationship between the two nations. These tensions made it clear that a formal and enduring treaty was necessary, especially to resolve issues stemming from the Farakka Barrage and to ensure fair water distribution.

A breakthrough came on 12th December 1996, after prolonged negotiations between the two countries. On that day, India’s then Prime Minister H. D. Deve Gowda and Bangladesh’s Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina signed the long-awaited water-sharing treaty. The agreement marked a historic turning point, bringing hope and cooperation after years of unresolved friction.

For Bangladesh, the treaty was vital—it meant guaranteed access to dry-season water for agriculture, environment, and livelihood needs. For India, it served as a diplomatic victory, allowing it to maintain friendly ties with a neighbour and address West Bengal’s needs, such as irrigation and silt flushing from the Kolkata port.

What helped make this treaty possible was the improved political climate in both countries. The newly elected Sheikh Hasina government in Bangladesh was keen on strengthening ties with India. On the other side, India’s United Front government was flexible and willing to engage constructively. The 1996 treaty was designed to last 30 years, up to 2026, and it included a clause for renewal through mutual agreement. This was also the first comprehensive water-sharing agreement between the two countries since Bangladesh’s independence.

Key provisions of the water-sharing deal

The treaty laid out a detailed plan for sharing the Ganga waters at Farakka during the dry season (from 1st January to 31st May). It used historical data from 1949 to 1988 to establish benchmarks for river flow. Based on the measured flow in 10-day blocks, the treaty determined how much water each country would receive.

To simplify:

• When the Ganga’s flow is 70,000 cusecs or less, both countries split the water equally—50% each.

• When the flow is between 70,000 and 75,000 cusecs, Bangladesh gets a fixed share of 35,000 cusecs, and India receives the rest.

• If the flow goes above 75,000 cusecs, India is entitled to 40,000 cusecs, and the remaining water goes to Bangladesh.

The treaty also includes provisions to manage scarcity during peak agricultural demand. Between 11th March and 10th May, the treaty ensures that each country gets a minimum of 35,000 cusecs during alternating periods to reduce the risk of crop failure and water stress.

However, in situations where the river flow drops dramatically, there is no hard guarantee of minimum water delivery. Instead, Article II of the treaty says that if the flow falls below 50,000 cusecs in any 10-day period, “the two governments will immediately consult and make adjustments on an emergency basis according to principles of equity and no harm to either party.”
This clause acknowledges the unpredictability of river flow and encourages both sides to respond cooperatively instead of committing to water that may not be available.

To monitor compliance, the treaty set up a Joint Committee of technical experts from both nations. This team tracks daily water flows, shares real-time data, and ensures that the terms are being followed properly. The Joint Committee meets three times a year to assess operational matters. If disagreements arise, they are to be resolved diplomatically either through the Joint Rivers Commission (JRC) or through other mutually acceptable means. Importantly, this treaty does not involve third-party mediation, which distinguishes it from some other international river agreements.

Three decades of cooperation and contention

Nearly 30 years have passed since the signing of the 1996 Ganga water treaty, and in that time, it has largely maintained peace over what remains a deeply sensitive and contentious resource. Both India and Bangladesh have generally respected the seasonal water-sharing arrangements, adhering to the schedule and regularly exchanging data on river flow to maintain transparency and coordination. Officials from both sides often highlight the treaty as a positive example of neighbourly cooperation, pointing to its longevity and the mechanisms it created for mutual engagement.

But the road hasn’t been entirely smooth. Bangladesh, on numerous occasions, has expressed its dissatisfaction, particularly during dry years when water flow was significantly lower than expected. Dhaka has argued that the treaty’s formula is based on 20th-century flow averages and does not guarantee the country’s rightful share in practice.

Concerns have been raised based on data that allegedly shows a discrepancy in water delivery. Between 1997 and 2016, Bangladesh reportedly received less water than promised in 94 out of 300 ten-day blocks at the Hardinge Bridge, which lies downstream from Farakka. While these deliveries may have technically aligned with the treaty’s terms, Bangladesh claimed that it did not always get the full amount due.

Furthermore, there were instances where India was accused of withholding water during Bangladesh’s critical months—March and April—and releasing it later, after the planting season had passed. While such actions might have stayed within the treaty's legal framework, Bangladesh argued they undermined its agricultural productivity, making it harder for farmers to plan and plant crops in time.

Environmentalists and local organisations in Bangladesh have also voiced their worries. They argue that the treaty focuses only on water quantity at Farakka, while ignoring the ecological consequences downstream. For example, lower dry-season flows in the Padma (the name for the Ganga in Bangladesh) have reportedly led to increased salinity in river water and degradation of wetlands in the country’s southwest. These changes not only impact biodiversity but also affect farming and fisheries.

On the Indian side, however, some feel the treaty has been overly generous to Bangladesh. Politicians in West Bengal, in particular, have repeatedly raised concerns that while India ensures its neighbour receives water, its own cities and farmers suffer from shortages.

The West Bengal government, led by Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee, has taken a firm stance against how the renewal of the treaty is being handled. They labelled the process as “unilateral” and demanded greater state involvement in any future agreements. Indian government sources have acknowledged that the 1996 deal forced changes to the Farakka Barrage’s operations. Originally, the barrage was meant to divert 40,000 cusecs of water into a canal to support the Kolkata port, which is crucial for trade and transport.

However, the treaty has now redirected much of this water towards Bangladesh during the dry season, which has caused problems. The Kolkata harbour has experienced increasing siltation, making it harder for ships to pass, and the power plant in Farakka has faced cooling water shortages. This has led to growing domestic pressure on the Indian government to reconsider how long it should prioritise its neighbour’s needs over its own citizens.

Ironically, even within India, opinions differ depending on geography. In Bihar, which lies upriver from Farakka, local officials have accused the barrage of releasing too much water during the monsoon, thereby exacerbating floods and silt accumulation in the Ganga basin.

These contrasting complaints from different Indian states show just how complex the situation is. They highlight the urgent need to rethink the treaty not only in terms of international relations but also to balance inter-state interests within India. The central government is now under pressure to accommodate both domestic and diplomatic needs, which won’t be easy without a more adaptive and equitable framework.

Renewal and renegotiation in a changing climate

As 2026—the expiration year of the Ganga treaty—approaches, both India and Bangladesh are preparing for what could be a significant renegotiation. Recognising the urgency, the Government of India in late 2023 formed a committee that included representatives from West Bengal and Bihar to evaluate India’s water requirements from the Ganga.

At the same time, Bangladesh has made it clear that any reduction in water share would be disastrous. The country heavily relies on the Ganga for agriculture, drinking water, and fisheries, especially during dry months. During Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s visit to Delhi in June 2024, which turned out to be her last before her departure from office, Prime Minister Narendra Modi assured that treaty renewal talks would begin, reaffirming India’s commitment to maintaining strong bilateral ties.

In March 2025, expert-level technical teams from both countries met in Kolkata to begin joint flow measurement at Farakka, marking the formal start of discussions on the next version of the agreement. However, the renegotiation is happening in a very different world than in 1996—climate change is now one of the biggest influences on water availability.

A 2019 study by the International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD) has already warned that climate change could drastically alter the flow volumes of both the Ganga and Brahmaputra. According to their projections, by 2050, the Ganga could see sudden and significant reductions in dry-season flows, impacting millions of people living downstream.

Both India and Bangladesh now recognise that any future treaty must be more resilient to climate impacts. Experts suggest that the next version must include flexible water allocation schedules, joint flood management systems, and enhanced real-time data sharing to respond quickly to unexpected changes in flow. These additions would make the agreement more adaptable to erratic weather and unpredictable hydrological patterns.

Politics, too, will have a major role to play in shaping the new agreement. Since August 2024, Bangladesh has been under an interim government. India has signalled that it would prefer to finalise such a significant treaty with an elected government, as that would ensure broader legitimacy and stronger implementation.

There’s another factor that’s complicating matters: Bangladesh’s interim leadership under Mohammad Yunus has developed closer ties with China. This development has made India more cautious in its dealings, as water diplomacy is tightly linked with regional security concerns.

Still, both India and Bangladesh have compelling reasons to keep this partnership alive. The treaty is more than just a document—it represents decades of diplomatic trust. If the treaty were to lapse in 2025, it could lead to uncertainty, mistrust, and potential conflict between the two nations.

At the heart of the upcoming discussions lies a delicate balancing act. India’s water demands have grown massively with its expanding population and development goals. At the same time, Bangladesh’s survival during dry seasons depends heavily on continued Ganga access.

As the original treaty terms no longer reflect current realities, it is crucial for both countries to approach the negotiations with a spirit of science, cooperation, and compromise. The next Ganga treaty must serve not only as a water-sharing framework but also as a symbol of responsible diplomacy.

“The waters of the Ganga have kept flowing peacefully for 30 years. The next version of the Ganga water treaty will thus be more than a dry legal document. It will be a litmus test of the two nations’ ability to share a lifeline river while keeping India’s changed requirements a priority. As a fast-growing economy, India cannot afford to lose a major chunk of water that has the potential to change the future of its people.”