On 25 February, the Supreme Court finally brought an end to a legal battle that had continued for more than one hundred years over hereditary wahiwatdar pujari rights at the Amogasidda temple in Karnataka. A bench of Justices Prashant Kumar Mishra and K Vinod Chandran dismissed the appeals filed by the appellants and affirmed the Karnataka High Court’s judgment dated October 2012.

In its order, the court clearly explained the limited scope of its powers under Article 136 of the Constitution. It stated, “It is neither novel nor uncertain that this court in catena of judgments has held that the jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India should be used sparingly. More particularly, when dealing with concurrent findings of fact. Unless and until the findings rendered by the courts below are manifestly perverse, this court should be reluctant to intervene in the same.”

The bench further observed, “In the present lis before us, both, the high court as well as the First Appellate Court, have rendered concurrent findings on the aspect of the pujari rights over the subject temple and held in favour of the respondents or plaintiffs,” thereby making it clear that two lower courts had already reached the same conclusion after examining the evidence in detail.

A Dispute That Spanned Generations

The case centered on rival claims made by two families. The appellants, represented by Ogeppa (deceased), and the respondents, represented by Sahebgouda (deceased), each claimed ancestral rights to serve as hereditary wahiwatdar pujari of the Amogasidda temple.

Amogasidda, a saint who passed away approximately 600 years ago, has his samadhi at Mamatti Gudda temple in Jalgeri, Arkeri, Karnataka. Over time, the right to conduct worship, receive offerings from devotees, and organize the temple’s annual Jatra celebration became the subject of intense dispute between the two families.

The central issue was simple in wording but complex in history: which family held the lawful hereditary right to perform religious rituals, manage offerings, and oversee temple celebrations.

Court’s Key Observations on Contradictions

The court examined the claim of the appellants that their predecessor had secured a favorable ruling in Suit No. 287/1901 and therefore retained rights over the temple. However, the First Appellate Court and the High Court had both noted that the appellants were “conspicuously silent” about an important fact. Despite claiming possession, they themselves had filed Suit No. 88/1944 seeking possession and rights over the temple.

The justices pointed out the inconsistency in their conduct. They remarked, “Though the Trial Court in this suit has decreed against them, the considerable factor is that the suit was filed for possession of the temple. On the one hand, they claimed that the previous suit instituted by their predecessor was in their favour and they have been granted the possession of the temple and pujariki rights and on the other, they filed a suit seeking the same relief in 1944.”

The bench raised a logical question that went to the heart of the matter. It noted, “If the appellants or defendants had a decree of possession in their favour, the question arises as to how and when they lost possession of the subject premises. This fact has been considered by both the courts and it also manifests that the written statement of the appellants or defendants is silent on this aspect,” highlighting the absence of any clear explanation.

The court agreed with the High Court that if the appellants were indeed in settled possession and performing their duties without interruption, there would have been no need to file a suit seeking control and injunction. It stated firmly, “A party in settled possession does not sue for possession. The very institution of that suit is a categorical admission by the predecessor of the appellants or defendants that the possession was not with them at the relevant point in time. This inference drawn by both, the First Appellate Court and the high court, is legally sound.”

Long Silence and Its Consequences

Another critical aspect of the case was the long period of inaction by the appellants’ predecessor. After losing before the Trial Court in 1945, a civil appeal was filed. Later, a motion was made to withdraw the claim with liberty to file a fresh suit. Permission was granted on 15 June 1946. However, no new suit was filed for over three and a half decades.

The Supreme Court took serious note of this gap. It observed, “The appellants or defendants have offered no explanation, either in their pleadings or in their evidence, as to what transpired during this long interregnum. As the high court correctly observed, when a party obtains liberty to file a fresh suit and consciously refrains from doing so for thirty-six years, the inevitable inference is that it had reconciled itself to the factual reality on the ground. This conduct speaks louder than any decree of 1901 that the appellants or defendants seek to wave before this court.”

The High Court had also carefully examined documentary records after remand. The Record of Rights (RTC) showed the names of the plaintiffs’ ancestors as recipients of lands granted by the British government in exchange for service to the Amogasidda temple. Significantly, the records did not mention the appellants or their ancestors.

The Supreme Court noted that given the century-long litigation over the same temple, the appellants could not claim ignorance of these revenue records or dismiss them as unsupported by evidence.

Crucial Admission During Cross-Examination

A key turning point in the case was the cross-examination of Defendant Witness 1, Ogeppa. The witness denied that land had been granted to the Amogasidda temple in Mammatigudda but admitted that land had been given in connection with the Amogasidda temple in Jalageri village, which was the very temple under dispute. He also acknowledged that the plaintiffs were cultivating the land.

The court treated this admission as highly significant, stating that it settled the issue regarding the grant and its connection to the plaintiffs.

The bench further emphasized the importance of proper pleadings in such disputes. It observed, “We also find ourselves in agreement with the observations made by the high court as regards the written statement filed by the appellants or defendants. A party setting up a competing claim to hereditary pujari rights is obligated to plead specifically – when they came into possession of the suit temple, when they commenced performing puja, when and how the respondents or plaintiffs began obstructing them and what steps, if any, they took to vindicate their rights during the long intervening period.”

The written statement of the appellants lacked these details. The court described their reliance on the 1901 decree and simple denials as wholly insufficient. It made clear that oral testimony cannot replace missing pleadings and that evidence cannot be used to build a case that was never properly presented.

Final Verdict of the Supreme Court

After reviewing all records, admissions, and witness statements, the bench concluded that the plaintiffs had consistently supported their claim through revenue documents, documentary evidence, admissions made by the appellants’ witness, and testimony from independent witnesses including devotees who confirmed that the plaintiffs were performing puja as hereditary wahiwatdar pujaries.

The court stated, “The appellants or defendants, on the other hand, rest their claim almost entirely on a century-old decree, the effect of which was demonstrably undone by their own predecessor’s subsequent conduct in instituting a suit for possession in 1944. The concurrent findings of the First Appellate Court and the high court reflect a correct and careful ppreciation of this entire factual matrix,”

In conclusion, the bench declared, “Hence, we find no perversity in the impugned judgment of the high court dated 04.10.2012. Accordingly, the Civil Appeals are sans merit and are dismissed. No orders as to costs.”

How the Dispute Began

The origins of this dispute trace back to 1944 when Ogeppa Biradar and others filed a suit seeking possession of the temple and its properties. They alleged that the plaintiffs had taken control of the temple against their will and claimed the right to perform puja. The Trial Court dismissed their suit. A First Appeal was filed in 1945.

During the appeal, the appellants sought permission to withdraw the case with liberty to file a fresh suit. The plaintiffs agreed. The Appellate Court granted this request and set aside the earlier verdict in 1946. However, no new suit was filed for decades.

In 1967, the plaintiffs alleged that the appellants began interfering with temple worship. They sought a perpetual injunction to protect their peaceful possession and their pujariki rights. An ex-parte decree was granted but was later dismissed for want of prosecution.

Renewed Litigation in 1982

On 24 March 1982, the present plaintiffs filed a fresh suit before the Principal Munsiff in Bijapur seeking a permanent injunction and a declaration that they were the hereditary wahiwatdar pujargi entitled to worship at the temple.

They stated that the first plaintiff held eight annas share in the rights, while the others shared the remainder and performed duties alternately. They claimed to have conducted year-round puja and the annual Jatra at Chaity Amavasya, receiving offerings from devotees.

They further alleged that from 20 March 1982, the appellants, with police assistance, obstructed daily worship, attempted forced entry at night, and removed puja articles. The plaintiffs filed a trespass complaint and sought legal recognition of their rights. They also demanded registration of the temple as a public trust before the Assistant Charity Commissioner of Belgaum.

The appellants relied on earlier litigation where their ancestor Gurappa, son of Manigeppa Poojari, had been granted rights. They claimed continuous performance of jatra, acceptance of offerings, and ownership of the temple structures.

On 18 November 1986, the Trial Court partially decreed the matter, declaring both parties as pujargies and directing that puja and jatra be conducted in proportion. It rejected the injunction request.

Both sides appealed. On 5 July 1990, the First Appellate Court dismissed the appellants’ appeal and upheld the plaintiffs’ claim, declaring them hereditary pujari.

Journey Through Higher Courts

The appellants approached the Karnataka High Court through second appeals. On 24 July 1992, the High Court allowed the appeals, holding that the Additional Civil Judge lacked jurisdiction due to Section 80 of the Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950.

The plaintiffs then moved the Supreme Court through special leave petitions. On 28 March 2003, the Supreme Court allowed the appeals and remanded the matter to the High Court, clarifying that Section 80 did not bar the civil court’s jurisdiction and that the case must be decided on merits.

After rehearing the matter, the High Court on 4 October 2012 dismissed the appellants’ objections and upheld the plaintiffs’ claim.

The appellants again approached the Supreme Court, leading to the final judgment delivered on 25 February, which has now brought this century-old dispute to a definitive close.